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Resilience of European farms with and without the CAP 
 
Abstract 
Firms are able to survive only if they adapt appropriately in response to disturbances. 
The ability of a farm to continue after a disturbance is defined as resilience. To 
analyse the resilience of EU farms we explain exit and the number of adaptation 
strategies that farmers follow under two scenarios. The current CAP will be continued 
in the base scenario, while  it will be abolished in scenario 2. The outcomes show that 
under both scenarios large more specialised farms with young farm heads are most 
resilient, and small more diversified farms headed by old farmers are least resilient.  
 





The term regime shift is used in ecology to describe a sudden, rapid transition of an 
ecosystem from one stable state to another. Such a transition occurs when a certain 
tipping-point or threshold is passed. Typical for regime shifts is the non-linear 
response of a system property to a disturbance in an exogenous driver. Often, such 
transitions cannot easily be reversed: the location of the tipping-point depends on the 
direction of the change, a property known as hysteresis. Well-known examples are the 
shift from low to high algae concentrations in shallow lakes (Scheffer and Carpenter, 
2003) and the shift from grassy to woody savannahs (Rietkerk, et al., 2004). Besides 
ecosystems, the principles of tipping-points and regime shifts can be applied to a 
broad range of systems (Scheffer, et al., 2009). This paper presents an application to 
farms. Like ecosystems, farms can be seen as complex adaptive systems characterized 
by multiple feedbacks across their parts. They exhibit strong autonomous dynamics 
and a disturbance in an exogenous driver can result in non-linear responses with farm 
exit being an extreme example. However, despite the presence of regime shifts, 
systems often show a remarkable capability to retain similar structures and 
functionality after disturbances.  
Disturbances are defined here as events that disrupt a farm business (cf. 
Janssen and Osnas, 2005). Disturbances can be idiosyncratic in nature, e.g. a farm 
family crisis or the impact of an outbreak of an animal disease or extreme weather 
conditions. On the other hand, disturbances can also be structural in nature – i.e. 
affecting the whole farm sector or all farm business in a certain sector, e.g. policy 
reforms. Disturbances can be sudden, i.e. a shock, but are often just gradual changes 
in an exogenous driver.  
Farm resilience, the ability to cope with disturbances, is difficult to analyse 
empirically because disturbances differ in nature, size and over time, they are 
experienced differently by different farmers and mostly data can only be collected 
from the survivors of disturbances. It is therefore not surprising that there are only a 
few empirical studies on resilience and tipping-points available in the agricultural 
economics literature. The studies that do exist, often only deal with certain aspects of 
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resilience or a specific tipping-point, e.g. studies on farm exit (e.g. Kimhi and 
Bollman, 1999; Weiss, 1999; Glauben, et al., 2004; Dries and Swinnen, 2004).  
In this paper we adopt a novel approach to overcome the problem of sample 
selection bias that would occur if only survivors of a disturbance – i.e. resilient 
farmers – are included in the dataset. To this end, farmers are asked about their future 
intentions – rather than past actions – in response to a disturbance. We investigate 
resilience in the case of two policy regimes (1) a fully liberalised Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and (2) the continuation of the current CAP. Farmers are 
asked to indicate for both policy regimes if they will exit or not. Furthermore, if they 
claim to continue – i.e. the tipping-point is not reached - they are asked which 
alternative strategies they intend to implement to cope with the disturbances in both 
policy regimes. Adaptation strategies are plans of farmers to deal with disturbances. 
The strategies are focused around increasing or decreasing a single variable. 
Examples of these strategies are (dis)investing in machinery, borrowing money, 
changing off-farm employment, leasing or leasing-out land, buying or selling land, 
changing the amount of contract work on the farm, etc. In other words, the strategies 
involve changing the (ways of) employment of labour, land and capital on the farm.  
Farmers that indicate that they will exit are considered to be the least resilient. 
Farmers that indicate that they implement many adaptation strategies as a result of a 
disturbance are considered to be less resilient than farmers that adapt only a few or no 
strategies. The number of strategies is considered to be a measure of farm resilience 
because adaptation strategies enable a farmer to cope with disturbances.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse farmers’ resilience under different policy 
scenarios. Because we ask farmers about their future intentions with respect to exit 
decisions and adaptation strategies rather than past actions, we measure perceived 
instead of real resilience, and indicated instead of actually followed strategies.  
 
The dataset consists of about 1400 farm households that were interviewed in 11 case-
study areas in the EU representing different farming types and regions. Farms differed 
in their location, specialization, size, business environment and institutional 
environment. In the empirical section, we estimate a logit model of farm exit and two 
zero-inflated negative binomial models - one for each scenario - to explain the number 
of adopted strategies (Long and Freese, 2001). The estimation procedure for the latter 
model consists of two distinct processes: the inflate equation that corresponds to the 
binary model predicting the likelihood that the farm will not adopt any strategies and 
an equation for the number of strategies adopted.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 
discusses the  conceptual and the empirical models. Results are discussed in Section 4. 
The paper finishes with a general discussion and conclusions. 
 
 
2. Data  
 
Survey 
In 2009, interviews were carried out as part of the EU project CAP-IRE on the future 
of the CAP in 11 case study regions in 9 countries of the EU: Emilia-Romagna (Italy), 
Macedonia and Thrace (Greece), Podlaski (Poland), North-East of Scotland (UK), 
Andalusio (Spain) South-East Planning Region (Bulgaria), Centre (France), Midi-
Pyrénées (France), Lahn-Dill-District (Germany), Ostprignitz –Ruppin (Germany), 
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North-Holland (the Netherlands). Results were used from a questionnaire carried out 
with a mix of phone, postal and face-to-face interviews depending on the possibilities 
in the case study areas. The farm head or one of the farm heads was asked to fill in the 
pre-coded questions. The questionnaire contained questions about the farm and farm 
household, the business environment and the reaction to two scenarios. 
 
Scenarios 
The first scenario is ‘the CAP stays as it is’ and the second one is ‘the abolition of the 
CAP’. The scenarios will be labelled as ‘present CAP’ and ‘no-CAP’ respectively. 
More precisely, farmers were asked for the present CAP scenario to “assume that 
prices, employment opportunities and other conditions remain stable at the January 
2009 levels and that the CAP develops how it is currently planned. For points that 
have not been decided after 2013, assume they remain stable at the 2013 level till 
2020”. For the no-CAP scenario farmers were asked to consider the situation that “all 
CAP payments you receive (including rural development payments), and all other 
CAP instruments (e.g. milk quotas, cross-compliance) are removed in 2014. Farm 
households were asked to give their judgment about their future behaviour, i.e. exit or 
not and the number of strategies they were intending to implement, taking into 
account changes in their farm household that are expected to take place within the 
present CAP scenario and the no-CAP scenario.  
 
Data 
We will concentrate on 1368 farm households who responded that they will continue 
under the present CAP scenario and who either continue or quit farming under the no-
CAP scenario. If a farm exits regardless of the disturbances ahead, it does not make 
sense to ask for strategies that they will follow when they continue. From the survey, 
several variables were derived. Table 1 gives an overview of the data used for the 
estimation. Column 2 (mean) shows the mean value of the variables of the farms that 
continue in the present CAP scenario. Column 4 does that for the 894 farms that 
indicate that they will continue in the no-CAP scenario. The first row of the table ‘the 
average number of adaptations’ gives the number of strategies farmers indicate they 
will follow under both scenarios. Part-time labour measures the share of farm 
household heads that have a job outside agriculture.  
For the farmers that responded that they will continue in both scenarios the CAP 
abolition does not influence the decision about exit or continuation. There are 474 
(1368-894) farmers that responded that they will continue in the present CAP scenario 






Table 1 – Data for the average farm 
 









Average number of adaptations 3.62 3.16 3.59 3.20 
     
Percentage of farmland leased (%) 41.54 36.63 37.57 35.72 
Percentage part-time labour (%) 27.44 32.48 23.99 29.84 
Single farm payment per ha (€) 413.82 708.44 298.87 538.60 
Income from farming > 50% (dummy) 0.69  0.76  
Household members (number) 3.73 1.40 3.75 1.43 
Membership social organisation (dummy) 0.29  0.27  
Membership farmers union (dummy) 0.52  0.52  
Membership nature preservation 
organisation (dummy) 0.06  
 
0.07  
Multifunctional non-farm activities 
(dummy) 0.19  0.19  
Area (ha) 98.77 258.96 99.81 276.71 
Age (years) 46.45 12.47 45.33 13.00 
Agricultural education (dummy) 0.61  0.65  
Higher education (dummy) 0.28  0.27  
Specialisation in livestock (dummy) 0.26  0.32  
Specialisation in crops (dummy) 0.35  0.35  
 
    
Regions:     
Emilia - Romagna, Italy (dummy) 0.11  0.14  
North-Holland, the Netherlands (dummy). 0.08  0.11  
Macedonia and Thrace, Greece (dummy) 0.19  0.10  
Podlaskie, Poland (dummy) 0.17  0.23  
North East of Scotland, UK (dummy) 0.06  0.07  
Southeast Planning Region, Bulgaria 
(dummy) 0.11  0.12  
Centre, France (dummy) 0.04  0.04  
Midi Pyrénées, France (dummy) 0.04  0.05  
Lahn-Dill-District, Germany (dummy) 0.04  0.02  
Ostprignitz-Ruppin, Germany (dummy) 0.07  0.04  
Andalucia, Spain (dummy) 0.10  0.07  
Source: CAP-IRE survey  
 
 
3.  Model 
 
Theory 
Theoretically a farm household will stop its enterprise when the discounted flow of 
farm profits is lower than the discounted flow of income from an alternative activity 
including (early) retirement. Many factors that play a role in the farm exit decision 
have been investigated in the literature. These factors can be divided into personal 
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characteristics (e.g. age), social capital (e.g. membership of farm organisations) and 
policy variables (e.g. farm payments)  (see e.g. Kimhi and Bollman, 1999; Weiss, 
1999; Glauben, et al., 2004; Dries and Swinnen, 2004). The decision whether or not to 






() < 	 	()(farm	exits)									 (1) 
 
Where: : farm household j’s decision whether to exit or not, 	
: discounted profit from 
farming for farm household j, 	: discounted income from the best alternative for 
farm household j, : vector of explanatory variables for farm household j. 
 
In micro-economic theory not much attention has been paid to adaptation strategies as 
a reaction to disturbances. This is in contrast to the management literature where they 
are often considered as instruments of strategic management decisions (see e.g. 
FitzRoy et al., 1998; Ricketts, 2002). The adaptation strategies in this paper involve 
changing the (ways of) employment of labour, land and capital on the farm. On each 
of these topics there is a large amount of literature. However, it goes beyond the 
purpose of this paper to discuss this literature here. 
 
Empirical model 
Two models have been estimated. A first model will explain the indicated exit of 
farms in the no-CAP scenario. Second, a model has been estimated that explains the 
number of adaptation strategies. As farmers adopt strategies in both scenarios this 
model has been estimated for both scenarios separately. The variables described in 
Table 1 have been included in the empirical models. 
It is expected that farmers who own a large share of their land (a small share 
of farmland is leased) are more likely to continue farming under both scenarios as 
they do not have to pay land rents which makes them less susceptible to disturbances. 
With more part-time labour and in case farms are involved in multi-functional non-
farm activities, farmers have alternative sources of income making them also less 
susceptible to disturbances. On the other hand income alternatives could increase the 
probability of exit in case of CAP abolition. 
The average single farm payment (SFP) per hectare is about 110 euro lower 
for farms who continue in the no-CAP scenario. This variable was included in order to 
determine the importance of the SFP for an individual farm. It is expected that the 
more important these payments are the more susceptible farms are to disturbances, 
and therefore the more likely they are to exit or to adopt more survival strategies. On 
the other hand large farms receive more support than small farms so one has to correct 
for farm size. If income from farming is relatively important we also expect these 
farms to be more susceptible to disturbances. Large farms are expected to be less 
susceptible to disturbances.  
Memberships of social organisations, farmers unions and nature preservation 
organisations are expected to represent social and human capital. That could have two 
opposite effects. First, they make farms less susceptible to disturbances so they do 
need to adopt many strategies. Second, if they need to react to disturbances it enables 




Regional dummies represent regional differences in legal structures and social 
and cultural values that could affect the possibility to adopt certain strategies.  
Age, type of specialisation and the number of household members could also 
influence the number of strategies adopted representing experience, past experiences 
with changes and possible strategies, and alternative sources of incomes respectively. 
 
Adaptation strategies 
Table 2 gives an overview of the adaptation strategies chosen in response to the 
disturbances in the present CAP scenario and the no-CAP scenario. Adaptation 
strategies are plans of farmers to deal with future disturbances. The strategies are 
focused around increasing or decreasing a single variable, e.g. changing the amount of 
land leased or employees hired. Farms either increase or decrease the variable of 
interest, e.g. land leased. We listed 15 different adaptation strategies.  
About 55% of the farmers indicated to adopt between 1 and 5 strategies. About 20% 
did not choose any of the 15 strategies proposed. Adjusting the machinery park, 
adapting buildings, change in land ownership and land leasing, change in hiring 
employees and alter use of family labour on farm are mentioned most often as 
strategies.  
 
Table 2 The percentage of farmers that alter the use of a strategy in the present CAP 
scenario (A) and no-CAP scenario (B) compared to the present situation. 
Significance level refers to whether or not the difference between both 
scenarios is significantly different. 
 Number of strategies changed scenario... 
Variable A B Significance level 
Family labour on-farm 29% 30%  
Family labour off-farm 15% 20% *** 
Employees 29% 28%  
Land ownership 28% 23%  
Land leasing 35% 29% *** 
Land renting out 6% 7%  
Number of animals 28% 23% *** 
Other activities 29% 21%  
Use of fertilizers and agro-chemicals 26% 29% * 
Use of water 18% 18%  
Buildings 30% 23% *** 
Machinery 36% 27% *** 
Contract work 19% 24% ** 
Borrowing money 27% 39% *** 
Contract production 18% 18%  




First, a logit model has been estimated to determine what the probability is that farms 
continue farming under the no-CAP scenario and which variables determine that 
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choice. Second, to analyse the number of strategies that farms indicate to adopt, a 
zero-inflated negative binomial model has been estimated. A Poisson model was 
rejected because of signs of overdispersion (see Verbeek, 2004: 212), that is, a greater 
variance than might be expected in a Poisson distribution. The dataset contains a 
relatively large number of zero observations (no strategies are adopted) which led to 
the rejection of the standard model in favour of a zero-inflated negative binomial 
model. A reason for not adopting a strategy could be that these farms consider 
themselves to be robust or they have difficulties to imagine what changes they may 
implement, and therefore, give a zero answer. The zero-inflated count model merges a 
binary logit with a negative binomial model (Long and Freese, 2001). The estimation 
procedure consists of two distinct processes: the inflate equation corresponds to the 
binary model predicting that the farm indicates to follow no strategies and an equation 
for the number of strategies farms indicate to adopt (count equation). The Vunong test 
(Long and Freese, 2001) supports the zero-inflated negative binomial model over the 
negative binomial model. 
 
 
4.  Results 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the logit model of farm continuation. 
 
Table 3 Marginal effects of Logit model on farm continuation (farms that exit 
in the no-CAP scenario compared to the present CAP scenario)1. 
Variable   
Percentage of farmland leased (%) 0.99 *** 
Percentage part time labour (%) 1.00  
Single farm payment per ha (€) 1.00 ** 
Income from farming more than 50 per cent (dummy) 1.34 * 
Household members (number) 1.03  
Membership social organization (dummy) 1.11  
Membership farmers’ union (dummy) 0.99  
Membership nature preservation organization (dummy) 1.51  
Multifunctional non-farm activities (dummy) 0.98  
Area (ha) 1.00  
Age (years) 0.98 *** 
Agricultural education (dummy) 1.11  
Higher education (dummy) 0.88  
Specialization in livestock (dummy) 1.37  
Specialization in crops (dummy) 1.51 ** 
Regions   
Emilia - Romagna, Italy (dummy) 4.37 *** 
North-Holland, the Netherlands (dummy). 6.19 *** 
Macedonia and Thrace, Greece (dummy) 0.63 * 
Podlaskie, Poland (dummy) 5.01 *** 
North East of Scotland, UK (dummy) 3.38 *** 
Southeast Planning Region, Bulgaria (dummy) 3.10 *** 
Centre, France (dummy) 1.63  
Midi Pyrénées, France (dummy) 2.18 * 
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Lahn-Dill-District, Germany (dummy) 0.51  
Ostprignitz-Ruppin, Germany (dummy) 0.62  
Andalucia, Spain (dummy)   
Number of observations = 1368, statistical significance: * = P < 0.10; ** = P < 0.05; *** = P 
< 0.01 
1: A number smaller than 1 implies that the variable has a negative effect on continuation. 
The opposite is true for a value larger than 1. 
 
The marginal effect  !" is the exponential of the estimated coefficient #$	of the logit 
model. For  !" > 1 one can say that for a unit change of the variable the odds are  !" 	larger, for  !" < 1 the odds are  !" smaller. For example for each per cent of 
land leased extra, the odds of continuing the farm is 0.99 smaller, holding all other 
variables constant. So, A number smaller than 1 implies that the variable has a 
negative effect on continuation. The opposite is true for a value larger than 1. 
 
Farm households that earn more than 50% of their income from agriculture are more 
likely to continue farming in the no-CAP scenario (marginal effect is larger than one). 
Farms that get a larger single farm payment per ha are less likely to continue 
(marginal effect is slightly smaller than one). So farmers that are more dependent on 
the CAP are more likely to exit when the CAP is abolished. Older farmers are more 
likely to exit in the no-CAP scenario compared to the present CAP scenario (marginal 
effect is smaller than one). Membership of farmers’ unions and nature preservation 
organizations do not influence the probability to continue under the no-CAP scenario. 
Farms that lease a relatively large amount of land are less likely to continue in the no-
CAP scenario (marginal effect is smaller than one). Land lease makes them more 
susceptible to shocks. Arable farms are more likely to continue (marginal effects are 
larger than one). The case study area dummies illustrate differences related to case-
study specific factors such as the regional institutional environment, history and 
geographical characteristics. 
 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the equation explaining whether or not 
strategies will be adopted in the present CAP and the no-CAP scenario (inflate 
equations). Table 5 gives the results for the equation explaining the number of 





Table 4 Marginal effects for the binary equation of the zero inflated negative 
binomial regression1 
Variable Marginal effect Marginal effect 
 
Present 
CAP  No-CAP  
Percentage of farmland leased (%) 0.60  1.85  
Percentage part time labour (%) 1.49  1.17  
Single farm payment per ha (€) 0.86  1.27  
Income from farming > than 50% (dummy) 1.31  0.49 * 
Household members (number) 0.71 *** 0.59 *** 
Membership social organisation (dummy) 1.62 * 1.45  
Membership farmers’ union (dummy) 0.60 ** 0.89  
Membership nature preservation organisation 
(dummy) 0.52  2.08  
Multi-functional non-farm activities (dummy) 0.94  0.42  
Area (ha) 0.02 ** 0.01 * 
Age (years) 12.33 *** 6.69  
Agricultural education (dummy) 1.38  0.63  
Higher education (dummy) 0.75  0.38 * 
Specialization in livestock (dummy) 1.02  0.43  
Specialization in crops (dummy) 1.62 * 0.84  
Regions:     
Emilia - Romagna, Italy (dummy) 0.87  2.41  
North-Holland, the Netherlands (dummy). 0.06 ** 0.31  
Macedonia and Thrace, Greece (dummy) 1.02  0.67  
Podlaskie, Poland (dummy) 0.60  5.71  
North East of Scotland, UK (dummy) 0.40  1.67  
Southeast Planning Region, Bulgaria (dummy) 0.12 *** 0.74  
Centre, France (dummy) 1.46  0.38  
Midi Pyrénées, France (dummy) 0.44  0.76  
Lahn-Dill-District, Germany (dummy) 1.49  2.94  
Ostprignitz-Ruppin, Germany (dummy) 0.59  5.32  
Number of observations = 1368, statistical significance: * = P < 0.10; ** = P < 0.05; *** = P 
< 0.01 
1: A number smaller than 1 implies that if the variable goes up by 1 then the number of 
strategies goes down. The opposite is true for a value larger than 1. 
 
 
There are two explanations for the differences between the results for both scenarios 
in Table 4. First, the number of farms in the no-CAP scenario is smaller because 
farms exited because of the abolishment of the CAP, this has a negative effect on the 
significance of the results found. Second, farms that exit have different characteristics 
than those that continue. This has been investigated with the logit model presented in 
Table 3. In the present CAP scenario some farms can cope with disturbances while 




Larger farms are less likely to adopt strategies in both scenarios (marginal effect is 
smaller than one). The same holds for farms where the farm household has a large 
number of members.  
In the present CAP scenario membership of a social organisation has a 
significantly positive effect (marginal effect is larger than one). Membership of a 
farmers’ union has a significantly negative effect (marginal effect is smaller than one). 
Social capital apparently plays a role, but it can have a positive or negative effect. A 
reason for the difference could be that membership of a farmers’ union is more likely 
for ‘conservative’ farmers that hope politics will solve their problems instead of 
dealing with them by adopting adaptation strategies. Membership of a social 
organisation would be in that case a way to increase social and human capital to be 
better equipped to deal with disturbances. In the no-CAP scenario neither variable 
plays a significant role although the signs are the same. This is probably due to the 
smaller number of farms that continue (see Table 3).  
Increasing age of the farmers has a significantly positive effect in the present 
CAP scenario on the decision whether or not strategies are adopted (marginal effect is 
larger than one). This could reflect the experience older famers have gained during 
their live dealing with risks. In the no-CAP scenario this variable has no longer a 
significant influence. This may be because older farmers are overrepresented in the 
farms that exit as is confirmed by the results in Table 3.  
  Arable farms (specialisation in crops) are more likely to adopt strategies in the 
present CAP scenario (marginal effect is larger than one). This could be due to the 
fact that these farms, opposed to dairy farms, have more experience with dealing with 
uncertainty. This experience makes that they learned that uncertainty requires action. 
In the no-CAP scenario this variable is no longer significant. Apparently there is a 
relatively large number of arable farms among the farms that exit (which the 
continuation model confirms, see Table 3). The shock of CAP abolition is too large to 
cope with for small arable farms, e.g. because of the effect of the abolishment of the 
single farm payments. 
Farms where a relatively large share of the income is coming from agriculture 
and where the education level is high are less likely to adopt strategies in the no-CAP 
scenario but not in the present CAP scenario (marginal effect is smaller than one). 
Apparently, there is a relatively large number of farms among the farms that exit with 
income coming from alternative sources and with farmers having a lower education 
level (again the continuation model confirms this, see Table 3). 
Farms in North-Holland and the Southeast Planning Region are less likely to 
adopt strategies in the present CAP scenario (marginal effect is smaller than one). For 
North-Holland this could be due to the large share of dairy farms that do not feel the 
urge yet to deal with disturbances, and the large share of flower bulb farms that are 
not affected by the CAP as they do not receive any CAP subsidies. For Bulgaria the 
explanation could be found in the large former state farms that are already accustomed 
to a very uncertain environment. In the no-CAP scenario these results are no longer 






Table 5 Marginal effects for count equation of zero inflated negative 
binomial regression on number of strategies per farm1  
Variable Marginal effect Marginal effect 
 
Present 
CAP  No-CAP  
Percentage of farmland leased (%) 1.18 ** 1.24 *** 
Percentage part-time labour (%) 0.83 ** 0.90  
Single farm payment per ha (€) 0.94 * 1.01  
Income from farming > than 50% (dummy) 1.10 * 0.98  
Household members (number) 1.03 ** 1.02  
Membership social organisation (dummy) 1.28 *** 1.19 *** 
Membership farmers’ union (dummy) 1.02  1.27 *** 
Membership nature preservation organisation 
(dummy) 1.04  1.13 * 
Multifunctional non-farm activities (dummy) 1.06  0.95  
Area (ha) 0.93  1.10  
Age (years) 0.49 *** 0.42 *** 
Agricultural education (dummy) 1.10 ** 1.01  
Higher education (dummy) 1.11 ** 1.13 ** 
Specialization in livestock (dummy) 1.29  1.09  
Specialization in crops (dummy) 1.10 * 1.01  
Regions:     
Emilia - Romagna, Italy (dummy) 0.67 *** 0.59 *** 
North-Holland, the Netherlands (dummy). 1.06  1.33 ** 
Macedonia and Thrace, Greece (dummy) 0.93  0.72 ** 
Podlaskie, Poland (dummy) 0.89  0.35 *** 
North East of Scotland, UK (dummy) 0.81 * 1.01  
Southeast Planning Region, Bulgaria (dummy) 1.93 *** 1.44 *** 
Centre, France (dummy) 0.80 * 0.98  
Midi Pyrénées, France (dummy) 0.70 *** 0.94  
Lahn-Dill-District, Germany (dummy) 1.08  0.93  
Ostprignitz-Ruppin, Germany (dummy) 1.07  0.89  
Number of observations = 1368, statistical significance: * = P < 0.10; ** = P < 0.05; *** = P 
< 0.01 
1: A number smaller than 1 implies that if the variable goes up by 1 than the number of 
strategies goes down. The opposite is true for a value larger than 1. 
 
Table 5 presents the number of strategies farmers indicate to adopt for both scenarios. 
There are two explanations for the differences between the results for both scenarios 
in Table 5. First, the number of farms in the no-CAP scenario is smaller, this has a 
negative effect on the significance of the results found. Second, farms that exit have 
different characteristics than those that continue (see Table 3).  
The percentage of land leased has a positive effect in both scenarios on the 
number of strategies adopted (marginal effect is larger than one). Farms that lease a 
relatively large share of their land are less likely to continue (see Table 3), more land 
leased makes farms apparently more susceptible to disturbances, and therefore 
increases the number of strategies. Part-time versus full-time labour has a negative 
effect on the number of strategies adopted but only in the present CAP scenario. More 
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part-time labour implies that farmers have alternative sources of income making them 
less susceptible to disturbances. The reason that in the no-CAP scenario this variable 
is no longer significant could be caused by the fact that many of the farmers that exit 
are part-time farmers (which the continuation model confirms, see Table 3). 
Although older farmers are more likely to adopt a strategy to cope with 
disturbances they adopt less strategies than younger farmers in both scenarios. Better 
educated farmers adopt more strategies in both scenarios. Farmers with an agricultural 
education also adopt more strategies but this is only significant for the present CAP 
scenario. In the no-CAP scenario this variable does no longer have a significantly 
positive effect. This may be caused by the fact that a relatively large amount of these 
farms decides to exit in case of CAP abolition (which the exit model confirms 
although the variable is not significant, see Table 3) and the smaller the number of 
farms in the no-CAP scenario. 
Farmers that are relatively dependent on CAP support, as indicated by the 
single farm payment, are less likely to adopt a large number of strategies in the 
present CAP scenario. This is as expected. The single farm payment is not significant 
in the no-CAP scenario as there are no subsidies anymore. The continuation model 
confirms that farms that are dependent on CAP support are more likely to exit (see 
Table 3).  
A large share of agriculture in total income has a significantly positive effect 
on the number of strategies adopted in the present CAP scenario this effect alters in 
sign and is no longer significant in the no-CAP scenario. For a farm in the present 
CAP scenario for which agriculture is important it seems obvious that strategies to 
cope with disturbances are found within agriculture because the strategies selected 
relate to agricultural practices (see Table 2). This explains the significantly positive 
effect in the present CAP scenario. Farms that decide to continue in the no-CAP 
scenario are large and specialised, and therefore less likely to adopt a large number of 
strategies to deal with disturbances (which the continuation model confirms, see Table 
3). This explains that there is no significant effect of this variable in the no-CAP 
scenario.  
Larger farms are less likely to adopt strategies to cope with disturbances 
(Table 5), and therefore, it is not surprising that farm size has no effect on the number 
of strategies farmers indicate to adopt to deal with disturbances. 
Although farms where the farm household has a large number of members is 
less likely to adopt a strategy to survive they adopt more strategies. This could be due 
to the larger possibilities they have compared to smaller farm households. In the no-
CAP scenario this variable is no longer significant which could be due to the smaller 
number of farms in the case of the no-CAP scenario.  
Membership of a nature preservation organisation and a farmers’ union have 
no significant effect on the number of strategies adopted in the present CAP scenario 
but do have a positive effect in the no-CAP scenario. This could be because these 
memberships in a more uncertain environment (no-CAP versus CAP) could provide 
information that helps to construct social and human capital that makes it easier to 
deal with disturbances. For the same reason membership of a social organisation has a 
positive effect in both scenarios. 
The regional dummies show a very mixed result. This could be due to regional 
differences in legal structures and social and cultural values that could affect the 





5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Farms that decide to exit because of CAP abolition are the least resilient to the new 
regime that CAP abolition represents. Results show that farms that indicate to exit are 
the ones that are most dependent on CAP support, lease a relatively large share of 
their land, have old farm heads, and are part-time and diversified farms. 
 
The results also indicate that - besides being less likely to exit - large, more 
specialised farms with young and highly educated farm heads adopt no or fewer 
adaptation strategies both under the current CAP and in the situation where the CAP 
is abolished. These farms are clearly most resilient. They do not need (m)any 
strategies to cope with disturbances in either of the two scenarios. On the contrary, 
small and less specialised farms that are relatively dependent on CAP support and 
have older and less educated farm heads indicate that they adopt a lot of strategies to 
deal with disturbances even if the present CAP is continued.  
 
More in general a higher level of education and membership of social organisations 
enable farms to adopt more strategies. Both factors are related to human and social 
capital.  
 
The results clearly show that there are differences between farmers, farms, and 
regions with respect to resilience and tipping-points. As a result, policies that try to 
improve resilience of farms to future disturbances need to be tailor-made. This is 
extremely relevant given the upcoming CAP reforms. However, besides disturbances 
linked to CAP reform the approach used in this research can also be applied to other 
disturbances, e.g. to climate change or on-going globalisation. 
 
A caveat of the model is that the strategies in the dataset are based on intentions 
related to two not very realistic scenario’s. In that sense this research could be 
considered as a choice experiment (e.g. McFadden, 2005). So it is not actual 
behaviour that is studied but indicated behaviour. Despite this caveat the model is 
valuable because it is one of the first attempts to model and empirically study the 
resilience of farms and the influence of a wide variety of factors such as farm and 
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